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Criminal Procedure-CoNFEssioNs-APPLicAnoN OF MIRANDA V.
ARIzoNA. Rodney P., age 16, was implicated in the theft of an automobile by another youth, Daniel W. Subsequently, a detective approached
Rodney in his yard and asked his two companions if they would leave,
which they did. The detective then questioned Rodney briefly, and he
admitted taking the auto along with Daniel.' He was not advised at any
time of his right to counsel or to remain silent. Following his plea of
guilty, he was adjudicated a youthful offender and was given a threeyear suspended sentence. The trial court found that the Miranda warnings2 were not required before the brief interrogation and refused to
suppress his oral admissions. On appeal from the Appellate Division
(which affirmed the lower court conviction), the New York Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment and, collaterally, the decision concerning Rodney's oral confession.3
The abolition of certain judicial and police interrogations and the extension of the right to remain silent has gradually and somewhat systematically evolved. 4 The Supreme Court apparently climaxed this movement in Miranda v. Arizona5 when it said that an individual has the
constitutional right to remain silent whenever "....

he has been taken

into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way." 6 The Court held that neither exculpatory nor inculI. It would appear that the detective intended to arrest Rodney before he made
the self-incriminating statements and that the youth was aware of this intent.
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. People v. Rodney P. (Anonymous), 21 N.Y.2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 255, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225

(1967).
4. See generally, J. GEORGE, CONSTITUI1ONAL LIMITATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
CAsEsq, 69-70 (I.C.L.E. SPECIALTY HANDBOOK No. 16, 1966); Kamisar, A Dissent from

the Miranda Dissents, 65 MIcmGAN L. REv. 59, 66 (1966). Miranda was actually the
culmination of a group of decisions extending the sixth amendment right to counsel:
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (to arraignment stage); White v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 59 (1963) (to preliminary hearing stage); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201 (1964) (to indictment stage); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (to accusatory stage). Escobedo also required that an accused individual be given a warning
that he had a right to remain silent. Id. at 490-491. This case marked a radical change
in the law of confessions because it shifted the basis for exclusion from involuntariness
to constitutional rights under the fifth amendment. Miranda extended the fifth amendment right to the custodial stage, and also extended the right to counsel in a manner
similar to Escobedo's extension of the right to remain silent.
5. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6. Id. at 444. Before Escobedo and Miranda, the Supreme Court had relied primarily
on a "voluntariness" test of confessions applied under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. See The Supreme Court, 196Y Term, 80 HARv. L. REv. 91 at
203. Under this former interpretation, the Court was limited to dealing with confes-
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patory statements stemming from questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after an individual has been deprived of his freedom may
be used as evidence unless that individual had been warned of his rights."
Clearly, this constitutional right 8 applies to station house questioning 9
and probably to police car questioning, 10 and, by the terms of the
decision, does not extend to general on-the-scene questioning," however, exactly what " . . . deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way . .. " means and at what point home and street interroga2
tions are included has not been clearly resolved.'
Recent cases in which the courts were required to determine where
the right to remain silent arose have employed several different approaches. A subjective test involving the voluntariness of a confession,
i.e., whether it was the product of "free and rational choice"-had been
used by most courts since 1941.1 This test has generally been rejected
sions in the courtroom (at the trial or at preliminary hearings). Id. However, recent
decisions ending with Miranda have held that the fifth amendment self-incrimination
clause also applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964);
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). By shifting the emphasis to the fifth amendment,
the Court, in Escobedo and Miranda,was able to extend rights against self-incrimination
to the pre-courtroom stage.
7. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 at 444. The Court required that an individual be
given a four-point warning that ". . . he has a right to remain silent, that any statement
he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Id.
The Court incidentally confirmed that the right to appointed counsel is coextensive
with the right to retained counsel. Id. at 472-473. See also Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
8. The Court submitted that this right could be waived; however, the requirements
for proof of such waiver are indeed strenuous. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 at
470-471, 475 (1966).
9. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 at 445-458, 477 (1966).
10. This would probably be true because a police car can be viewed as an extension
of the station house.
11. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 at 477-478 (1966).
12. For general discussions, see Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents, 65
L. REv. 59 (1966); Rothblatt and Pitler, Police Interrogation, 42 NoRE
DAME LAwYER 479 (1967); 33 BROOKLYN L. REv. 347 (1967); 67 CoLum. L. REv. 130
(1967); 36 FoRDHAm L. Rav. 141 (1967). See also note 33 infra.
MicHIGAN

13. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Blackburn v. Alabama,
361 U.S. 199 at 207 (1960); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 at 53 (1949); United States v.

Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 at 68 (1944); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 at 241 (1941).
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by the courts in interpreting Miranda.1 4 After Escobedo v. Illinois'5
shifted the emphasis to fifth amendment rights, most courts have apparently determined that the "accusatory" stage of Escobedo and the
"in custody" stage of Miranda were reached when a questioned individual was made aware of a police intent to arrest him.' 6 Generally, the
courts have examined the police intent and the individual's awareness
on a case-to-case basis, considering the surrounding circumstances in
each. 17 However, some courts have suggested that, in the absence of
warnings, no statements would be allowed after the police first formed
the intent to arrest.'8 California, for example, has established an objective standard-whether a reasonable man would have felt restrained in
a significant way.' 9 The only apparent generalization is that most courts
14. This test was suggested by the language of the Miranda Court that an individual
is "in custody" if he is deprived of his freedom in any significant way. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 at 444 (1966). It was further suggested when the Court said
that compulsion consisted of inherent psychological pressures which prevented a
statement from ". .. truly being the product of his own free choice." Id. at 456. It is
generally rejected however, apparently because Mirandawas not intended to subject the
police to the idiosyncrasies of every person they question.
15. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
16. The holding in Escobedo was generally that the right to retained counsel accrues ".... when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory, i.e., when its focus
is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession." Id. at 490 (for complete
holding, see pp. 490-492). Escobedo applied primarily to sixth amendment rights which
also affect the states because of the fourteenth amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963); Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954); House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42
(1945). However, it did require that the accused be warned that he has a right to
remain silent. Since the Miranda Court said it was defining Escobedo's "focus" of the
investigation as custodial interrogation (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 at 444), the
courts have extensively employed decisions interpreting Escobedo in interpreting
Miranda.
The Escobedo and Miranda decisions are not retroactive to cases which went to
trial before June 22, 1964 and June 13, 1966, the dates they were decided, respectively.
Johnson v. New York, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
17. See Gaudio v. State, 1 Md. App. 455, 230 A.2d 700 (1967); State v. Boscia, 93
N.J. Super. 586, 226 A.2d 643 (App. Div. 1967); People v. Kulis, 18 N.Y.2d 318, 221
N.E.2d 541, 274 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1966); People v. Terrell, 53 Misc.2d 32, 277 N.Y.S.2d 926
(Sup. Ct. 1967); People v. Kenny, 53 Misc.2d 527, 279 N.Y.S.2d 198 (Sup. Ct. 1966);
People v. Glover, 52 Misc.2d 520, 276 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1966); People v. Reason,
52 Misc.2d 425, 276 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 423 Pa.
541, 226 A.2d 765 (1967).
18. People v. Reason, 52 Misc.2d 425, 276 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 423 Pa. 541, 226 A.2d 765 (1967).
19. People v. Arnold, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115, 426 P.2d 515 (1967); People v. Hazel, 60
Cal. Rptr. 437 (Dist. Ct. of Appeal, 1967).
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have rejected physical coercion or compulsion as a controlling factor,2
primarily because of the Miranda Court's emphasis on "psychological"
pressure.

2

1

Here, in People v. Rodney,22 the New York Court of Appeals first
rejected the generally applied subjective-type tests23 because it felt that
the circumstances did not evidence any sort of coercion.2 4 It then re-

jected the other subjective test (from the questioned individual point of
view) because it would ".... place upon the police the burden of anticipating the frailties or idiosyncracies of every person whom they question."

25

It did, however, adopt the objective standard (reasonable man),

relying heavily on what it considered the purposes and evils intended to
be eradicated by the Miranda decision,

"..

. to protect the individual's

freedom of choice-to answer or not answer-in situations which are
inherently coercive." 26
However, the New York Court introduced a new factor in applying
the objective test. It found that Rodney could not as a reasonable man
have believed that his freedom of action was restrained in a significant
way because he was not physically restrained (given the fact that he was
not told that he was under arrest or would be arrested). Most courts,
as mentioned above, had apparently rejected physical coercion as a
27
significant factor.
20. E.g., People v. Arnold, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115, 426 P.2d 515 (1967); People v. Glover,
52 Misc.2d 520, 276 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1966); People v. Reason, 52 Misc. 2d 425,
276 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 423 Pa. 541, 226 A.2d
765 (1967); see also Graham, What is Custodial Interrogation?, 14 U.CJL.A. LAw REv.
59, 76-77. Contra, People v. Johnson, 50 Misc.2d 1009, 271 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1966).
21. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 at 456. A possibility not actually discussed
in court opinions is that all of these interpretations are means of avoiding the inevitable.
The spirit of Miranda and Escobedo suggests that the Supreme Court may ultimately
require warnings at every stage of police interrogation (except general on-the-scene
questioning). The Court said, "[A] system of criminal law enforcement which comes
to depend on the 'confession' will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to
abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured
through skillful investigation." Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-489 (1964). See
Kamisar, A Dissent fronz the Miranda Dissents, 65 MICHIGAN L. Rzv. 59 at 66 (1966).
22. People v. Rodney P. (Anonymous), 21 N.Y.2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 255, 286 N.Y.S.2d
225 (1967).
23. Cases cited note 17 supra.
24. Id. at 5, 233 N.E. 2d at 259, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 231.
25. Id. at 6, 233 NZE.2d at 260, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 233.
26. Id. at 5, 6, 233 NE.2d at 259, 260, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 231, 233.
27. The different approach is made apparent in the dissenting opinion, which stated
that isolation was certainly sufficient psychological pressure and the officer's first
question was sufficient notice of probability of arrest. Any reasonable man would be-
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In Escobedo, the Supreme Court required that an individual be
warned of his right to remain silent when the investigation focused on
the accused, i.e., when it shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory
stage.28 Without exception, the authorities have regarded Miranda as a
liberalization of the rights assured in Escobedo.29 A questioned individual
must now be informed of his rights whenever he has been substantially
deprived of his freedom of action whether or not the accusatory stage
has been reached. In the instant case, the accusatory stage had obviously
been reached before any questions were asked, yet the New York Court
of Appeals held that the accused need not have been warned of his
rights. It is possible that this decision deprived the accused of rights
he had before the Miranda decision.
Constitutional Law-THE

RIGHT OF A LABOR UNION TO PROVIDE

A program whereby District
Twelve of the United Mine Workers of America furnished its members free legal counsel in presenting their individual workman's compensation claims to the Illinois Industrial Commission resulted in a
charge of unauthorized practice of law against the union.' Under the
FREE LEGAL COUNSEL TO MEMBERS.

lieve that he would be detained until he answered and that he had been significantly
deprived of his freedom of action. Id. at 8-9, 233 N.E.2d at 262-63, 286 N.Y.S.2d at
235-36.
The dissent went so far as to say that police intent to arrest, alone, was a sufficient
reason to find that an individual had been deprived of his freedom in a significant
way. See also People v. Reason, 52 Misc.2d 425, 276 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct. 1966);
Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 423 Pa. 541, 226 A.2d 765 (1967).
28. See note 6 supra. Escobedo was generally restricted to its facts. Birnbaum v.
United States, 356 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1966); United States v. Cone, 354 F.2d 119 (2d
Cir. 1965); United States v. Childress, 347 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1965); United States v.
Konigsberg, 336 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933 (1964); People v.
Hartgraves, 31 IM. 2d 375, 202 NXE.2d 33 (1964); Commonwealth v. Tracy, 207 N.E.2d
16 (1965); State v. Coleman, 46 NJ. 16, 214 A.2d 393 (1965); People v. Gunner, 15
N.Y.2d 226, 205 N.E.2d 852, 257 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1965); Biddle v. Commonwealth, 206
Va. 14, 141 S.E.2d 710 (1965); Browne v. State, 24 Wis.2d 491, 131 N.W2.d 169 (1964).
Contra, People v. Dorado, 40 Cal. Rptr. 264, 394 P.2d 952 (1964), rev'd on rehearing,
42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361 (1965). The Miranda decision actually determined four
different cases (Miranda v. Arizona, Westover v. United States, California v. Stewart,
and Vigera v. New York); therefore, Miranda could nor be restricted to a single set
of facts. Perhaps, the Supreme Court implied by this that Escobedo should not be so
restricted, either.
29. E.g., Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents, 65 MicmG"t L. REv. 59
(1966).

1. United Mine AWorkers of America, Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass'n, 88 S.Ct. 353
(1967).

